Theoretical and empirical approaches to cleft constructions

Day 1: Introduction to cleft constructions

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This is going to be an interactive course instead of us lecturing you for five days on end in heated afternoons with no some air-conditioning...zZZZ...





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- 3. Where are you from (affiliation and originally)?

Course website: https://swantje-toennis.github.io/esslli/

Days	Topics	Readings
Day 1	Introduction to cleft constructions	Hartmann and Veenstra (2013); Onea (2019)
	and the exhaustive inference:	
	theoretical options	
Day 2	Disagreements on the level where	DeVeaugh-Geiss et al. (2015)
	the exhaustive inference is located:	
	experimental evidence	
Day 3	Discourse-related approaches	Destruel and Velleman (2014)
	to cleft constructions	Tönnis (2021, ch. 8)
Day 4	Clefts and discourse expectations	Tönnis (2021, ch. 10), Tönnis and Tonhauser (2022)
Day 5	Summary and Discussion	(We need your questions for Day 5)

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- Cross-linguistically, cleft constructions constitute a good example to demonstrate variance in linguistic meaning, since they exist in many languages, but they vary structurally and functionally.

We hope you can benefit from the broad perspective on an interesting and challenging topic, the empirical-driven, cross-linguistic approaches of the course, and interactive discussions in class. :)

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- 4. Disagreement on the level where the exhaustive inference is generated: the <u>theoretical</u> side of the story

Let's review some concepts together

Here is an example, could you tell me which part of the underlined sentence is focus, background and its presupposition?

- (1) A: 'Who came to ESSLLI's class today?'
 - B: 'Only John came to ESSLLI's class today.'
 - B:' JOHN came to ESSLLI's class today.
- (2) A: 'John came to ESSLLI's class today.'
 - B: 'No, it was Mary who came to the class today.'

[exclusives] [plain focus]

[it-clefts]

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 - B:' JOHN came to ESSLLI's class today.
- (2) A: 'John came to ESSLLI's class today.'B: 'No, it was Mary who came to the class today.'

[exclusives] [plain focus]

[*it*-clefts]

Do you think there is a difference in their truth conditions?

The term *cleft* describes "a specific syntactic pattern which serves to separate a discourse prominent constituent structurally from the rest of the clause" (Hartmann and Veenstra, 2013).

(3)	lt	was	John	that/who came to ESSLLI's class today.
(\mathbf{J})	Impersonal pronoun	Copula	Cleft phrase/pivot	Cleft clause

A typical cleft construction contains four parts:

- an impersonal pronoun,
- a copula verb,
- an informationally prominent part that is the focus (i.e. the cleft phrase/cleft pivot),
- an embedded relative clause that is the *background* (i.e. the *cleft clause*).

(4) It was John that/who came to ESSLLI's class today. Impersonal pronoun Copula Cleft phrase/pivot Cleft clause

Syntactically, debates can be categorized into several camps.

• Both the impersonal pronoun and the copula are semantically inert. The cleft phrase and the cleft clause are directly connected (Hedberg 1990, Delin 1989, Jespersen 1937).

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- The impersonal pronoun is semantically inert. The copula connects the cleft phrase and the cleft clause (É. Kiss 1998, Hedberg 2000).
- Nothing is semantically inert. *It* is an anaphoric pronoun referring to a specific (event-type) antecedent (Akmajian 1970, Gundel 1977, Percus 1997).

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(5) exemplifies the three copular subtypes based on the taxonomy in Higgins (1979).

- (5) a. John is a student. [predicational]
 - b. The author of the paper is John. [specificational]
 - c. Venus is the Morning Star. The Morning Star is Venus. [equational]

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The predicational and the specificational type differ in the referentiality of the pre-copula subject and the post-copula complement.

Clause Type	Subject	Complement
Predicational	Referential	Non-referential
Specificational	Non-referential	Referential

Table: Types of copular clauses based on referentiality

Several types of constituents can function as a cleft phrase, e.g. DP (can be either subject or object) and PP as in term clefts, and CP as in propositional assertions.

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- (7) A: Who have you looked for?
 - B: It was John that I have looked for.
- (8) A: Where does the professor normally have his lunch?
 - B: It is at the dinning hall that he has his lunch.

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- (9) A: "But I never quite understand your friends. Why do they quarrel so?"
 - B: "It doesn't mean anything. It's just that they can't bear anybody to have an advantage..."

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- (9) A: "But I never quite understand your friends. Why do they quarrel so?"
 - B: "It doesn't mean anything. It's just that they can't bear anybody to have an advantage..."
- (10) A: Why are you cleaning up your house?
 - B: Shi [Zhangsan yao lai]_F.
 COP Zhangsan will come
 '(It is that) Zhangsan will come.'

[Mandarin Chinese]

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- (12) Continuous-topic *it*-cleft
 - A: "Do you know Brian's book? "
 - B: "Yes, in fact it was Brian's book that got me interested in clefts. "

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(13) "After the GOP national convention, he chose to continue attacking Republican rivals. He chose to attack the Gold Star family of a fallen soldier; and he chose to hire as campaign CEO Steven Bannon, the former head of Breitbart News whose controversial support of the 'alt-right' will keep Trump on the defensive on the issue of racism; and *it was Trump who recently chose to divide his own force –as Custer divided his force–by'softening'*,

'hardening', retreating, denying and delaying on his main line of attack: the issue of immigration and deportation."

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- (14) a. The person who came to ESSLLI's class today was John.
 - b. Who Swantje likes the most is Arne.
 - c. That is the man who stole the money.
 - d. There is Arne who is smiling.
 - e. All I ate for dinner was a salad.

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What is cleft's closest relative here?

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We will discuss more on the *wh-else* continuation in the following.

- (15) French *C'est* clefts (Destruel et al., 2019)
 - a. Qui a ri?
 who has laughed
 'Who laughed?'
 - b. C'est Marie qui a ri.
 it.is Mary who has laughed 'It's Mary who laughed.'
 - c. ^{??} Qui d'autre a ri? who else has laughed 'Who else laughed?'

- (16) German es-cleft (Tönnis, 2021)
 - a. Wer hat gelacht?
 who has laughed
 'Who laughed?'
 - b. Es war Arne, der gelacht hat.it was Arne who laughed has 'It was Arne who laughed.'
 - c. ^{??} Und wer hat noch gelacht? and who has also laughed 'And who else laughed?'

(17) Hungarian Pre-verbal focus construction (Onea and Beaver, 2011)

- a. Ki mosolygott? who laughed 'Who laughed?'
- MARI mosolygott.
 Mary laughed
 'Mary laughed.'
- c. ^{??} Es ki màs mosolygott? and who else laughed 'And who else laughed?'

- (18) Mandarin shi (...de) clefts
 - a. Shui xiaole? who laugh.ASP 'Who laughed?'
 - b. Shi Zhangsan xiaole (de).
 is Zhangsan laugh.ASP PRT
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- One obvious example is that there are two types of clefts in Mandarin and they are structurally alike.
- Another example is that it is felicitous to attach *too*-continuation to German *es*-clefts, but it is not acceptable with Hungarian pre-verbal focus constructions.

What inferences have you drawn?

Coming back to different types of focus constructions...

- (19) a. Only John came to ESSLLI's class today.
 - b. JOHN came to ESSLLI's class today.
 - c. It was John who came to ESSLLI's class today.

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[canonical inference]

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 - Somebody came to ESSLLI's class.

[canonical inference] [existential presupposition] Coming back to different types of focus constructions...

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- John came to ESSLLI's class.
- Somebody came to ESSLLI's class.
- Nobody other than John came to ESSLLI's class.

[canonical inference] [existential presupposition] [exhaustive inference]

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The *who-else* test can distinguish them. (What observation can you draw from these examples?)

- (20) A: Who came to the ESSLLI's class today?
 - B: Only John came to the class.
 - A: ^{??}Fine, and who else came?

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Hmm, is it related to different levels of meaning? Something called at-issue and non-at-issue meaning...? Maybe? :)

For at-issue level content, a negation yields a negated meaning of the target proposition. By contrast, non-at-issue meaning survives the negation (a member of entailment cancellation environments). For at-issue level content, a negation yields a negated meaning of the target proposition. By contrast, non-at-issue meaning survives the negation (a member of entailment cancellation environments).

- (23) a. I disagree.
 - b. No, that's not true.

Given a negation test, combined with the three inferences that we have drawn just now, do you see any difference among these constructions?

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- (24) A: 'Only John came to ESSLLI's class today.'
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- (24) A: 'Only John came to ESSLLI's class today.'
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• the exhaustive inference, 'nobody other than John came', is negated.
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- The interpretation of 'somebody came to ESSLLI's class' (existential presupposition) is structurally presupposed
- 'that person is John' (canonical inference) survived.

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When a cleft construction is negated,

- the exhaustive inference might be negated;
- the canonical inference is negated;
- the existential presupposition is structurally presupposed and it is not compatible with 'nobody.'

From this simple negation test, we can summarize that

	Exhaustive inference	Existential presupposition	Canonical inference
Only-exclusives	at-issue	non-at-issue	non-at-issue
Canonical focus	non-at-issue	non-at-issue	at-issue
<i>lt</i> -clefts	(??-)at-issue	non-at-issue	at-issue

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For an expression E,

- *E* entails the inference *P* as an at-issue content;
- *E* may also presuppose *P* as a non-at-issue content.
- E may conversationally implicate P, which makes it not part of E's semantic content.

Here is another observation that motivates the distinction between two layers of meaning where the exhaustive inferences of clefts differs from *only*-exclusives'.

- (27) a. # I know Mary ate a pizza, but it wasn't a pizza that she ate.
 - b. I know Mary ate a pizza, but she didn't only eat a pizza.

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This have led most scholars to abandon the view that *it*-clefts encode exhaustivity as their at-issue content.

Exhaustive inference as a conversational implicature

Horn (1981) argues that the exhaustivity of *it*-clefts is generated through a conversational implicature, rather than hard-wired in the structure of *it*-clefts.

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- In other words, other contextually-relevant referents that potentially instantiate the property of the predicate, i.e. *ate a pizza*, are all ruled out as not actually instantiating such property.
- This view of scalar implicature (SI) is based on a neo-Gricean mechanism (articulated in Horn 2005), in which implicature arises globally and operates on speech acts.

The option articulated by Horn is widely rejected in the literature due to the fact that the exhaustive inference is not as easy to cancel when compared to other recognized conversational implicatures.

- (29) a. #It was Mary who ate a pizza; John ate a pizza too.
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However, the idea that constructions such as *it*-clefts conversationally implicate exhaustivity is not unpopular in experimental literature. We will discuss this tomorrow.

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Could you tell my why the account fails to do so?

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By contrast, Büring and Križ's (2013) parthood-based conditional presupposition account gets us the correct prediction.

For the example of *it is* $[Mary]_F$ who ate a pizza,

 the presupposition that is being projected states that the referent of the cleft phrase is not a proper **subpart** of the referent of the cleft clause (Büring and Križ, 2013).
Can you name some other (set of) individuals that Mary could be a subpart of?

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The current account predicts the exhaustive inference as in 'the only person who attended was John's eldest daughter,' instead of 'the only daughter of John.'

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With respect to a *wh*-question, clefts semantically encode as part of their at-issue meaning that the canonical inference is a true answer, whereas they encode as a presupposition that the canonical inference is the strongest true answer to that question.

Velleman et al. (2012) proposed *it*-clefts and *only*-exclusives differ minimally in terms of what is presupposed and what is asserted.

• Given a proposition *p*, the cleft operator presupposes the maximality (i.e. no true answer is strictly stronger than *p*), while exclusives assert the maximality of *p*.

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Presuppositions and conventional implicatures, like all non-at-issue content, are expected to project from entailment-cancelling environments, as we discussed earlier. One potential issue that all presuppositional accounts face is that the intuitions of the projection in regard the exhaustive inference are not very clear, especially on the conditional presupposition.

Summary of Day 1

- Introduction to a cleft construction
 - components
 - different types of clefts
 - their relatives
- Cleft construction in other languages
- The meaning of a cleft construction and comparison to other focus constructions
- Debates on the level where the exhaustive inference is located
 - as a part of at-issue content
 - as a part of non-at-issue (e.g. presupposed) content
 - as a conversational implicature

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